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Abstract
This paper describes a baseline for the second iteration of the Fact Extraction and
VERification shared task (FEVER2.0) which explores the resilience of systems
through adversarial evaluation. We present a collection of simple adversarial at-
tacks against systems that participated in the first FEVER shared task. FEVER
modeled the assessment of truthfulness of written claims as a joint information
retrieval and natural language inference task using evidence from Wikipedia. A
large number of participants made use of deep neural networks in their submis-
sions to the shared task. The extent as to whether such models understand lan-
guage has been the subject of a number of recent investigations and discussion
in literature. In this paper, we present a simple method of generating entailment-
preserving and entailment-altering perturbations of instances by common patterns
within the training data. We find that a number of systems are greatly affected with
absolute losses in classification accuracy of up to 29% on the newly perturbed in-
stances. Using these newly generated instances, we construct a sample submission
for the FEVER2.0 shared task. Addressing these types of attacks will aid in build-
ing more robust fact-checking models, as well as suggest directions to expand the
datasets.
1 Introduction
Significant progress for a large number of natural language processing tasks has been made through
the development of new deep neuralmodels; higher scores for shared tasks such as Natural Language
Inference [2] and Question Answering [23] have been achieved throughmodels which are becoming
increasingly complex. This complexity raises new challenges: as models become more complex, it
becomes difficult to fully understand and characterize their behaviour. This has implications from
a statistical learning perspective as the more complex models can be prone to brittleness. From an
NLP perspective, there has been an ongoing discussion as to what extent these models understand
language [13] or to what extent they are exploiting unintentional biases and cues that are present
in the datasets they are trained on [22, 9]. When the model is evaluated on data outside of the
distribution defined (implicitly) by its training dataset, its behaviour is likely to be unpredictable;
such “blind spots” can be exposed through adversarial evaluation [26].
In this paper we focus on the use of adversarial evaluation in the context of fact checking: this is
the task of predicting whether a claim is supported or refuted by evidence (see [27] for an in-depth
task description). As automated systems for fact checking have potentially sensitive applications it is
important to study the vulnerabilities of these systems, as well as the deficiencies of the datasets they
are trained on. Through adversarial evaluation, where systems are exposed to examples of statements
intentionally created to result in incorrect predictions, we can better understand the limitations of the
systems and possibly use these adversarial instances to regularize the model through training data
augmentation [26, 8, 17].
Preprint. Work in progress.
FEVER Claim: Bullitt is a movie directed by Phillip D’Antoni
Evidence: Bullitt is a 1968 American action thriller film directed by Peter Yates and
produced by Philip D’Antoni
Label: REFUTED
Entailment Preserving Transformation Entailment Altering Transformation
There is a movie directed by Phillip
D’Antoni, it is called Bullitt.
Bullitt is not a movie directed by Phillip
D’Antoni
New Label: REFUTED New Label: SUPPORTED
Figure 1: Adversarial instances generated through rule-based transformations of existing claims
The Fact Extraction and VERification (FEVER) shared task [29] invited participants to build sys-
tems to predict whether short factoid sentences (referred to as claims) – manually written using in-
formation derived from Wikipedia – are SUPPORTED or REFUTED by evidence or whether there is
NOTENOUGHINFO to reach a conclusion. Most participants in the shared task modeled it as pipeline
consisting of an information retrieval component – finding pages/sentences with content relevant to
a given claim – and a Natural Language Inference (NLI) component – proving that given the evi-
dence, a claim is either SUPPORTED or REFUTED. The second iteration of the task (FEVER2.0)
is building on the same dataset, but takes the form of a build-it, break-it, fix-it task [6]. Builders
will create systems based on the original FEVER dataset and task definition; breakers will gener-
ate adversarial examples targeting the systems built in the first stage; finally, fixers will implement
solutions to remedy the attacks from the second stage.
We describe a baseline for the breaking stage FEVER2.0 shared task: we use simple, rule-based
transformations of claims from the original FEVER dataset to generate new ones from existing
instances in the dataset. This approach makes use of the same evidence, avoiding the need for ad-
ditional evidence finding, and the rules can either change or preserve their label with respect to the
evidence (see Figure 1). We also introduce metrics for scoring the potency of the attacks (which ac-
counts for the number of systems that incorrectly classify the newly generated adversarial instances).
We attack a number of state-of-the-art models: the Neural Semantic Matching Network [19], HexaF
Model [31], Athene [10] and Papelo [16] – the highest ranked systems for the first FEVER shared
task – as well as an ESIM model [4] with ELMo embeddings [21] and a Decomposable Attention
model [20] – built on the baseline architecture presented in [28]. We evaluated the effect of the rule-
based transformations on both the Information Retrieval and NLI components of these systems and
found that all systems achieved lower accuracyon the new data we generated with decreases of be-
tween 11.32% and 29.16%. Also, while the information retrieval components of some systems were
not affected to the same extent, our experimental results indicate that some implementations were
more sensitive the new, adversarial, data than others. We hope that this baseline implementation and
report serves as a useful resource for future participants of the FEVER2.0 shared task by showing
that a relatively simple method reasonably effective and highlighting in what ways the models we
test against are affected. To help participants, we release dockerized versions of the systems we test
against 1 as well as code for generating and evaluating adversarial examples 2.
2 Related Works
Adversarial examples have been initially studied in the field of computer vision. Szegedy et al.
[26] identified an over-sensitivity of state-of-the-art models whereby perturbations to the image (by
altering pixel intensities in a way which is imperceptible to humans) resulted in changes to the pre-
dictions made by the model. These perturbation were generated through altering the model input to
maximize the classification error. While the proposed methods of altering pixel intensities was gen-
erally imperceptible to humans, making similar perturbations to text is more challenging due to the
discrete symbol space and the need to preserve grammaticality: modifying a single token may either
change the label of the instance or introduce grammatical errors. Various methods for successful
1https://github.com/j6mes/fever-docker
2https://github.com/j6mes/fever2-baseline
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attacks have been proposed, including manual construction, character perturbations, addition of dis-
tractor information, rule-based transformations and paraphrasing, and automated generation. In our
brief survey, we compare these methods and the trade-off between the level of automation (which
allows both scale and diversity of new claims) and whether the perturbation unintentionally changes
the label of the instance or induces grammatical error, which would require human annotation to
identify and resolve.
Manual Construction Small adversarial datasets have been manually constructed and success-
fully used to identify limitations in Machine Translation [3, 11], Sentiment Analysis [15, 25] and
Natural Language Understanding [14] systems. Instances are generated that exploit world knowl-
edge, semantics, pragmatics, morphology and syntactic variations. By manually constructing adver-
sarial instances, the attacker would have a high degree of confidence that the text will be grammatical
and that instances will be correctly labeled. However, exploiting human knowledge of language is
comparatively expensive and is difficult to scale to construct larger datasets.
Character-level Perturbation Character-level attacks have also highlighted the brittleness of
NLP systems: by making letter swaps or insertions, Belinkov and Bisk [1] and Ebrahimi et al. [5]
have generated distorted examples which cause misclassifications or translation errors. While it is
unlikely that a single character can unintentionally change the meaning of a sentence, this method is
still intentionally introducing errors.
Distractor Information Jia and Liang [13] evaluated the addition of distractor information in
reading comprehension systems. Adversarial instances are generated for the SQuAD [23] shared
task (question answering against a short passage of text) by concatenating short distractor sentences
to the passage. The distractor sentences are generated through perturbing the question with entity
substitution and generating a false answer which has a similar form to the actual answer with rule-
based substitutions. Furthermore, the additional information concatenated to the original passage
of text is by construction irrelevant, as it is about another entity. Thus it is unlikely to cause a
change to the meaning of the text requiring the instance to be labelled. Additionally, this approach
does not require manual generation of the instances (human annotators are only used for filtering
out ungrammatical distractors) this would be less expensive than manual construction of adversarial
instances meaning that greater scale can be achieved without the risk of annotators unintentionally
introducing a bias.
Paraphrasing Iyyer et al. [12] and Ribeiro et al. [24] apply paraphrase-based transformations to
generate adversarial instances using alignments from parallel corpora from translation tasks. Iyyer
et al. [12] attack sentiment analysis and recognizing textual entailment systems, generating para-
phrases of instances with a encoder-decoder model architecture. In the process of generating ad-
versarial instances, the meaning could be altered requiring relabelling (for example a sentence pair
with an ENTAILMENT relation may become NEUTRAL after perturbation) or the newly generated
text could be ungrammatical. In an error analysis, the authors identified that in 17.7-22.3% of cases,
the generated examples were not paraphrases and in 14.0-19.3% of cases, the paraphrases were
ungrammatical. Ribeiro et al. [24] evaluate phrase substitutions, obtained from alignments from a
translation task, as a method of generating semantically equivalent instances for visual QA, senti-
ment analysis, and reading comprehension. The authors incorporate additional filtering to remove
instances that are ungrammatical or unnatural: rather than using human annotators, this is automated
through computing the probability of translating the original instance and getting the paraphrase
when back-translating.
Programmatic Construction of Adversarial Dataset Naik et al. [18] introduce a stress test eval-
uation dataset for NLI containing a number of methods for generating new claims that exploit limi-
tations and biases present in state-of-the-art models in the context of the MultiNLI [30] shared task.
The adversarial dataset was constructed by applying three types of transformations to the MultiNLI
development data split: meaning-altering transformations are performed to instances that require nu-
merical reasoning through rule-based transformation; distractor phrases that preserve meaning are
appended to instances (that exploit models’ biases for strong indicators for negation and sentence
length); finally, perturbations to some instances are introduced to mimic typographical errors. While
the rule-based changes would preserve the label and are grammatical, some of the changes in this
3
FEVER Claim: Lily James has been on TV.
Label: SUPPORTED
Evidence Combination 1 Evidence Combination 2
[wiki/Lily_James:1] She studied act-
ing at the Guildhall School of Music and
Drama in London and began her acting
career in the British television series Just
William (2010)
[wiki/Lily_James:0] Following her
supporting role as Lady Rose MacClare in
the period drama series Downton Abbey
(2012–2015), James had her film break-
through playing the titular role in the fan-
tasy film Cinderella (2015).
[wiki/Downton_Abbey:0] Downton
Abbey is a British historical period drama
television series set in the early 20th
century, created by Julian Fellowes.
Figure 2: Example FEVER dataset instance comprising a claim and multiple correct evidence sen-
tence combinations
dataset are not natural (for example, the word overlap rule which appended ‘and true is true’ tau-
tology is logically correct but unlikely to occur in everyday language). This approach is relatively
cheap in comparison to manual construction as one rule can be applied to many instances.
Automated Generation Zhao et al. [33] generate natural language adversaries for an NLI task
through the use of an autoencoder architecture. The new instances exhibit high diversity and are
regarded as “natural” with 86% of human annotators stating that the new instances were grammatical
and 81% stating that the new instances was similar to the original on a pilot study of 20 examples.
However, while this method will generate instances that are similar to the original, it is not certain
that the label for the newly generated instances will be preserved as similarity does not guarantee
semantic equivalence. Zellers et al. [32] introduce an adversarial method for generating negative
examples for a multiple-choice answer selection task through generating probable sentences (with
the aid of a language model) that induce misclassifications. Using this approach, however, it is not
possible to generate examples that preserve or deterministically alter the entailment relation: again
requiring the newly generated instances to be labeled by humans.
3 Adversarial Attacks Against FEVER
(The Break-it Phase of the FEVER2.0 Shared Task)
3.1 Task Definition
We start by formally defining the FEVER task for which we will be generating adversarial instances
for. A prediction for a FEVER instance (example in Figure 2) that comprises a claim sentence
x, correct (gold) label y, predicted label yˆ, set of correct evidence sentence combinations E =
[E1, . . . , Ek] and predicted evidence sentence combination Eˆ, it is scored as using equations 1 and
2.
Instance_Correct(y, yˆ,E, Eˆ)
def
= y = yˆ∧
(
y = NOTENOUGHINFO∨Evidence_Correct(E, Eˆ)
)
(1)
For claims labeled NOTENOUGHINFO, no evidence is required. Some claims require the combina-
tion of multiple sentences to be marked as fully supported or refuted: all sentences must be present
in order for the submission to be marked as correct. As there may be multiple correct combina-
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tions of evidence sentences that can be used to SUPPORT or REFUTE a claim, at least one of these
combinations needs to be predicted in its entirety for the prediction to be considered correct. 3
Evidence_Correct(E, Eˆ)
def
=
∨
E∈E
( ∧
e∈E
e ∈ Eˆ
)
(2)
Over a set of predictions made on labeled instances, Y , the FEVER score is defined as:
FEVER(Y)
def
=
1
|Y|
∑
(y,yˆ,E,Eˆ)∈Y
I[Instance_Correct(y, yˆ,E, Eˆ)] (3)
For diagnostic purposes, we also report label accuracy (ignoring the need for correct evidence):
Accuracy(Y)
def
=
1
|Y|
∑
(y,yˆ,E,Eˆ)∈Y
I[y = yˆ] (4)
The FEVER2.0 shared task requires breakers (participants generating adversarial instances) b ∈ B,
to generate and submit a balanced set (i.e. same number of instances per class) of novel claims
X˜b = {xb,i}
N
i=1, a label and set of evidence sentence combinations Y˜b = {(yb,i,Eb,i)}
N
i=1. The
number of novel claims in the submission will be limited: this will allow for manual evaluation to
ensure that each submitted adversarial instance meets the shared task guidelines4. The adversarial
instances generated that meet the guidelines (hereafter referred to as accepted instances: Xb, Yb) are
then submitted to all systems from the builders, and the predictions made by these systems are used
for scoring.
We evaluate the adversarial instances from each breaker (ignoring the ones that failed to meet the
guidelines) in two ways. The potency of the adversarial instances submitted by a breaker is defined
as the average error rate over all the of predictions made by all systems s ∈ S for labeled accepted
instances generated by a breaker b, Ys,b:
Potency(b)
def
=
1
|S|
∑
s∈S
(
1− FEVER(Ys,b)
)
(5)
To penalize breakers for submitting claims that do not meet the guidelines (such as those which
are ungrammatical or incorrectly labeled), the potency score will be scaled by the acceptance rate
(raccept =
|Xb|
|X˜b|
) of the claims submitted:
Adjusted_Potency(b)
def
= raccept × Potency(b) (6)
The resilience of a system s is defined as the FEVER score over all the accepted instances generated
by all the breakers:
Resilience(s)
def
= FEVER
( ⋃
b∈B
Ys,b
)
(7)
3.2 Method
The use of human annotators to construct large scale datasets for natural language processing risks
inducing biases and artifacts as the workers adopt strategies and shortcuts to generate examples.
We hypothesize that the annotators for FEVER used a common set of constructions that could be
3The full FEVER scorer is available as a stand-alone package on GitHub:
https://github.com/sheffieldnlp/fever-scorer and can be installed with pip install
fever-scorer
4An up-to-date version of the guidelines are available on the FEVER website:
http://fever.ai/task.html
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Transformation Pattern Template
Entailment Preserving (.+) is a (.+) There exists a $2 called $1
(.+) (?:was | is)? directed by (.+) $2 is the director of $1
Simple Negation (.+) was an (.+) $1 was not an $2
(.+) was born in (.+) $1 was never born
Complex Negation (.+) (?:was | is)? directed by (.+) There is a movie called $1 which
wasn’t directed by $2
(.+) an American (.+) $1 $2 that originated from outside the
United States.
Table 1: Example rule-based attacks that preserve the entailment relation of the original claim
(within the definition of the FEVER shared task), perform simple negation and more complex nega-
tions. The output new claims that are sufficiently different to confuse the classifier. The matching
groups within the regular expression are copied into the template (variables begin with $).
exploited to generate a new set of adversarial claims. Counting the bigrams within the claims in
training set, we identify the following forms: "is a", "an American", "was born", "directed by",
"starred in" are some of the most frequently occurring.
Using these common claim patterns, we apply a collection of rule based transformations to the
claims to generate new instances that do not reflect the patterns available in the training set. We
evaluate three different groups of transformations: one where entailment between the claim and evi-
dence is preserved, and two where it is reversed through negation (see examples in Table 1). The first
set of transformations are entailment-preserving rewrites of the claim. There are similar to the meth-
ods that the annotators would have used when generating the FEVER dataset and includes simple
techniques such as switching from active to passive voice, and adding pronouns. The second set of
transformations were simple negations to the claim, performedmostly through a simple negation the
sentences’ verb phrase and reversing any SUPPORTED label to REFUTED and vice versa. For some
claim types, intensifiers such as ‘certainly’ and ‘definitely’ were also included in the sentence where
this would not affect the entailment relation (as defined in Appendix A of [28]). The third set of
rules combine both the entailment-altering rewrites and the simple negations (without the inclusion
of any intensifiers), and we refer to them as complex negations.
We constructed 65 rules that matched the most common claim patterns, for example: X is a Y , X
was an Y , X was a Y , X was an Y , X was directed by Y , X died on Y , X died in Y , X was born
in Y , X is an American Y . 23 of these rules were entailment preserving, 19 were simple changes
to negate claims, 23 were complex changes that also negated the claims. We release all of the rules
that were used in this paper on our GitHub repository.
4 Experimental Setup
We evaluate pretrained models for the FEVER shared task and their robustness to the adversarial
instances we introduce in this paper. In this section, we compare the baseline model from Thorne
et al. [28] (TF-IDF information retrieval with a decomposable attention model for natural language
inference), a modified version of this model with an ESIM+ELMo for the NLI component, and the
top four highest performing scoring system from the 2018 task [19, 31, 10, 16]. For the baseline
system, we adapted the code from [28], using the ESIM+ELMo implementation from AllenNLP
Gardner et al. [7] and trained both the Decomposable Attention and ESIM+ELMo models with the
recommended parameters for each model as included in the AllenNLP implementation. For the four
highest scoring systems from the first shared task, we used the pretrained models released by each
of the participants.
The adversarial claims are generated by applying rule-based transformations (described in Sec-
tion 3.2) to existing FEVER instances. In this paper, we made observations on the FEVER training
set, counting common bigrams, that informed the creation of transformation rules that when applied
to the dataset would create a large number of instances. In our experiments, we chose to retain the
original evidence and only make changes to the claim text because it mitigates the need to expend
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effort annotating new evidence. We apply these rules to both the FEVER development and test
splits of the dataset split presented in Thorne et al. [28] 5 to generate a two datasets of novel claims.
In Section 5, we evaluate the effects of the rule-base adversary using the claims from the develop-
ment split and reporting the impact on both the NLI and Evidence Retrieval components. We report
changes in performance over the entire pipeline as well as in an oracle environment where only the
NLI component is tested. For this oracle evaluation, we replace the evidence retrieval module with
correct evidence as labeled by the annotators. For claims labeled as NOTENOUGHINFO in the oracle,
we sample sentences from the nearest Wikipedia page to the claim (using TF-IDF, consistent with
the NEARESTP approach reported by Thorne et al. [28]). We report the changes in FEVER Score
over the end-to-end pipeline system, as well as report the changes in accuracy of the NLI model and
the precision, recall and F1 of the evidence retrieval component. In Section 6, we create a sample
submission for the FEVER2.0 shared task and report the potency of our technique and the resilience
of the systems we evaluate against.
5 Results
65 rule-based transformations were executed to the data from the development set. There were 2708
instances that matched the regular expression patterns defined in these rules, which were used to
generate 29495 novel adversarial instances. We report results using the instances which matched the
rules (column labeled Before in Table 2) that were used to generate the novel adversarial instances
(column labeled After). In the new set of claims that were generated, only 15% were labeled as
NOTENOUGHINFO (as the negating rules were only applied to claims which were SUPPORTED
or REFUTED) which would preclude comparison against existing results as the FEVER evaluation
which assumes balanced class distribution. We balance our data by discarding instances at random
from the majority classes. In a more comprehensive breakdown in Section 5.1, we report results on
all instances, broken down by the types of rules used in the adversarial attack.
Model
Accuracy FEVER Score
Dev Before After Delta Dev Before After Delta
Oracle + DA 82.83 87.94 68.06 -19.88 = = = =
Oracle + ESIM 84.63 86.93 66.87 -19.16 = = = =
TFIDF + DA 51.94 50.50 39.18 -11.32 28.63 26.88 18.67 -8.21
TFIDF + ESIM 54.01 51.30 39.89 -11.41 33.72 33.17 21.62 -11.55
NSMN (UNC) 69.73 71.23 49.18 -22.05 66.59 67.96 46.26 -21.70
UCL 76.65 76.97 53.78 -23.19 69.42 71.06 47.73 -23.33
Athene 67.23 67.96 38.80 -29.16 62.39 63.99 34.13 -29.86
Papelo 75.60 74.75 55.73 -19.02 72.99 72.70 54.43 -18.27
Table 2: Summary of adversarial attack potency on three models using the FEVER development
data split. For the Before and After columns, the figures are reported on the subset of the data used
for the rule based transformation. We also report accuracy on the entire development split reported
in Thorne et al. [28] (9999 instances in total, Dev). For the case of the oracle evidence retrieval
component, FEVER Score is equal to accuracy.
We observe that in the oracle environment (using manually labeled evidence), both the ESIM and
Decomposable Attention models for natural language inference suffer a stark decrease in accuracy
when making predictions on the adversarial examples. The decrease is less pronounced when con-
sidering the full pipeline (i.e. with a non-perfect evidence retrieval component), which reduces the
upper bound for the FEVER Score and accuracy. This is due to the noise introduced by the evidence
retrieval component documented in Table 3.
The adversarial examples did not affect the information retrieval component of some systems to the
same extent as the NLI component. Most systems incorporated either TF-IDF of keyword matching
5Note: These are the development split and test split from the paper containing 9999 examples each that
were later concatenated, forming the development set of the first FEVER shared task
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Model
Precision Recall F1
Before After Delta Before After Delta Before After Delta
TFIDF 9.37 8.62 -0.75 39.07 35.30 -3.77 15.12 13.86 -1.26
UNC 42.49 45.38 +2.89 75.63 69.74 -5.89 54.41 54.98 +0.57
UCL 38.45 31.50 -6.95 84.86 79.62 -5.24 52.93 45.14 -7.80
Athene 26.50 25.53 -0.97 88.94 86.66 -2.58 40.84 39.44 -1.40
Papelo 95.21 96.64 +1.43 68.72 48.49 -20.23 79.82 64.85 -14.97
Table 3: Effect of adversarial attacks on the evidence retrieval component of the pipelines consider-
ing sentence-level accuracy of the evidence.
in their information retrieval component and thus they are little affected by our rule-based transfor-
mations which adding mostly stop words and reordering the words within the sentence. The only
expecption is Papelo, which even though uses TF-IDF to retrieve documents, its sentence-retrieval
component made use of an entailment classifier. While this approach maintained very high preci-
sion with the newly generated instances, the recall decreased indicating a brittleness for instances
that that differed from the distribution of the training set.
5.1 Effect of Transformation Types
In Section 3.2, we introduced three types of rule-based transformations (entailment-preserving para-
phrasing, simple negations, and complex negations that combine the first two) that were used to
generate the adversarial instances. Each of these rule-based transformations may expose different
blind-spots and limitations within the models: we evaluate these in isolation and present a summary
in Table 4 where we show that the systems under consideration exhibited a reduction in accuracy for
each our rule-based transformation types.
We observe in all oracle and pipeline cases (with the exception of the Athene system) that the reduc-
tion in accuracy for the claims generated through label-preserving transformations was lower than
the claims generated by the label-altering transformations. The effect of this is also exacerbated by
the fact that the negated claims is only a binary classification rather than three-way for the entailment
preserving claims. This may be revealing an inherent bias in the models similar to the one discussed
by Naik et al. [18], where models perform poorly for antonymous examples due to a dependence
on word-overlap as a feature, which we also observe with our negations. We also observe that 3 of
top 4 ranking systems from the shared task (UNC, UCL and Papelo) exhibit a reduction in FEVER
scorer for the negated instances. For the baseline (TFIDF+DA/ESIM) models, simple negations had
a lower impact on the FEVER score than entailment preserving claims, possibly due to the noise
coming from the poor evidence retrieval method (under oracle evaluation, this was not observed).
The Athene system had a high error rate for the entailment preserving transformations: even though
the model had an evidence recall of 86.37% for the adversarial instances, the FEVER score reduced
by 30.45%. On inspection, this model is mostly predicting SUPPORTED for our adversarial instances.
In contrast, the Papelo system had the lowest reduction (15.39%) in FEVER score for entailment
preserving adversarial instances, despite a reduction in evidence recall of 23.17%. This model also
exhibited a similar behaviour to the Athene model: while a large number of supported claims were
correctly classified, this model predominantly predicted NOTENOUGHINFO for the adversarial in-
stances. As this class does not require evidence to be correctly scored, ‘falling back’ to it resulted
in a higher score for balanced data. This also explains the low FEVER score for complex nega-
tions (a reduction of 37.58%), in this evaluating this class of transformation, we only considered
SUPPORTED and REFUTED claims while the model was mostly predicting NOTENOUGHINFO.
6 Sample FEVER2.0 Shared Task Submission
We construct a balanced sample submission for the break-it phase of the FEVER2.0 shared task. We
applied our rule-based transformations to the test set from [28] and then perform a stratified sample
yielding 1000 instances. We compare this to a baseline that comprises a sample of the unmodified
claims that reflects the current error rate of the systems prior to our adversarial attacks.
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Model Transformation
Accuracy FEVER Score
Before After Delta Before After Delta
Oracle+DA
Entailment Preserving 88.69 76.80 -11.89 = = =
Simple Negations 89.03 56.97 -32.06 = = =
Complex Negations 88.50 48.85 -39.65 = = =
Oracle+ESIM
Entailment Preserving 88.27 72.11 -16.16 = = =
Simple Negations 88.65 57.93 -30.72 = = =
Complex Negations 86.49 53.91 -32.58 = = =
TFIDF+DA
Entailment Preserving 52.42 43.89 -8.53 27.63 20.11 -7.52
Simple Negations 68.18 53.58 -14.60 31.90 25.34 -6.56
Complex Negations 66.96 47.70 -19.56 30.46 20.29 -10.17
TFIDF+ESIM
Entailment Preserving 52.50 43.52 -8.98 33.61 22.91 -10.70
Simple Negations 61.29 48.70 -12.59 33.29 25.24 -8.05
Complex Negations 59.56 47.77 -11.79 31.76 21.15 -10.61
UNC
Entailment Preserving 71.91 51.19 -20.72 68.69 48.21 -20.48
Simple Negations 75.54 53.72 -21.82 70.75 49.16 -21.59
Complex Negations 75.24 44.49 -30.75 70.56 40.67 -29.89
UCL
Entailment Preserving 78.24 56.75 -21.49 72.32 50.25 -22.07
Simple Negations 82.17 56.63 -25.54 73.31 47.84 -25.47
Complex Negations 82.36 49.96 -32.40 73.84 41.86 -31.98
Athene
Entailment Preserving 68.60 40.32 -28.28 64.85 35.40 -30.45
Simple Negations 71.52 56.95 -14.57 65.62 50.58 -15.04
Complex Negations 71.21 53.00 -18.21 65.70 46.45 -19.25
Papelo
Entailment Preserving 74.00 58.61 -15.39 71.99 57.21 -14.78
Simple Negations 68.54 42.87 -25.67 65.40 40.37 -25.03
Complex Negations 69.27 30.02 -39.26 66.39 28.81 -37.58
Table 4: Breakdown of the potency of the three classes of transformation for each model. For the
models with oracle information retrieval, the FEVER Score is equal to the label accuracy.
Rank Method
Potency
(%)
Accept
Rate (%)
Adjusted
Potency (%)
1 Our Method (Rule-based Transformation) 62.58 90 56.32
2 Baseline (Unmodified Instances) 45.48 97 44.12
Table 5: Sample leader-board for the FEVER2.0 breakers. The adjusted potency score is an estimate
based on the results of the manual inspection of the generated claims.
To verify the suitability of our method, we performed a manual evaluation of the claims generated
by the rule based transformation. 30% of the instances submitted was inspected and labelled as to
whether the claims were grammatical. We found that 270 (90%) of the claims met the submission
guidelines and 30 (10%) of the claims did not. Of the claims that did not meet the guidelines
due to being nonsensical or non-grammatical: 1 was generated from an original claim that had a
grammatical error; 8 were made from claims with more complex language that was not accounted
for when designing the rule-based transformations; and 21 had a systematic error where the third-
person neutral pronoun it was used for claims about people.
Considering the performance of the systems we test, we also present a leader-board ranked by the
resilience (average FEVER score for all breaker methods). While the Papelo system was ranked 4th
on the FEVER shared task, this model performs the best in this evaluation. In Table 4, we presented a
breakdown of results which indicated, that under entailment preserving transformations, this model
performed better for the other systems we tested against. Entailment-preserving transformations
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Rank System Resilience (%)
1 Papelo 63.16
2 UCL 58.31
3 UNC 57.16
4 Athene 47.00
5 TFIDF+ESIM 26.83
6 TFIDF+DA 23.37
Table 6: Sample leader-board for the FEVER2.0 systems ranked by the resilience (average FEVER
score over all breaker submissions).
accounted for around 60% of the claims sampled our submission6 which may account for this result.
The UCL system (ranked 2nd in the shared task) also performs better than UNC system (ranked 1st
in the shared task) in both this sample evaluation and the breakdown in Table 4. This may arise
from the fact that both teams make use of the development data that we used to generate our claims
differently (i.e. the pretrained UCL model we used incorporated development data to increase the
size of the training set whereas other models did not). As it is not possible to control how this data
is used in the FEVER2.0 shared task, our method for generating claims from transforming existing
instances may perform better (i.e. have more potency) when applied to instances that have not
previously been released to the public.
7 Conclusions
In this report, we explored the behaviour of systems for Fact Extraction and VERification under
adversarial attacks by applying simple rule-based perturbations to existing instances. We showed
that adversarial examples can be generated through very simple transformations that are low cost
and generate grammatically correct instances. We hope that the findings that we present in this
paper help continue the discussion on improving models to be robust and resilient to data from
outside of the training distribution. The FEVER2.0 shared task is just one forum for discussing
the robustness of models against adversarial examples. We hope that the techniques in this paper
help inspire participation in the task and that the data generated by the shared task may be used
by researchers in other disciplines to help characterize the data used to train their models and the
potential risks of attack that these models may face when deployed in the wild.
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